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The Application of Neuroscience Evidence on
Court Sentencing Decisions:
Suggesting a Guideline for Neuro-Evidence
Yu Du*
ABSTRACT
Recently, neuro-evidence has been increasingly accepted in courtrooms.
In 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court accepted its first quantitative
electroencephalography (qEEG) evidence, which was used to reduce a death
penalty to a life-in-prison sentence in a heinous homicide case. However,
sentencing decisions differ even when there are similar neuroscientific
mitigators. This article compares and analyzes why similar cases result in
different final sentences. This comparative analysis sheds light on how
neuroscience should be applied, interpreted, inferred, and generalized in a
variety of legal contexts. I offer seven suggestions to regulate the use of
neuro-evidence and potentially decrease its erroneous influence in court
sentencing decisions. Furthermore, I point out several neuro-challenges for
future research and debate. I am optimistic about the interconnection between
neuroscience and law in future legal reform.
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INTRODUCTION
Neuroscientific evidence has challenged traditional methods of
determining an offender’s mens rea and final sentencing decisions, especially
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in capital cases.1 The battle between the mitigating and aggravating effects
of neuro-evidence in the courtroom, as well as its weight, compared to other
circumstances, is pronounced and complicated.2 More intriguing, similar
capital cases that use neuro-evidence as a mitigator may result in different
sentencing decisions (i.e., the death penalty versus life in prison without
parole). Therefore, questions about (1) how judges and jurors evaluate neuroevidence and are influenced by its mitigating effects in legal contexts, (2)
whether all types of neuro-evidence have the same weight and mitigating
effects, and (3) why final sentencing decisions differ certainly require more
attention and analysis.
This review consists of four sections. The first section provides an
overview of the trends of the application and developments of neuroscience
in legal contexts. It also points out several philosophical challenges that
neuro-evidence faces in the evidentiary and sentencing stages of court cases.
In the second section, this review introduces two capital cases in which
neuro-evidence was presented as a mitigating factor, but which had two
different final sentencing decisions. In addition, this article provides a
compare-and-contrast analysis of why there are different mitigating effects
of neuro-evidence. The third section offers three cautions and limitations on
how to apply, interpret, and make inferences from neuro-evidence in legal
contexts. In section four, this article proposes a guideline to regulate the
mitigation and maximize the interpretive accuracy of neuro-evidence.
Further, it argues that there are other challenges for the applications of neurolaw and neuro-ethics that need to be considered and researched. A brief
conclusion follows. Although many cautions and critical considerations need
to be addressed, the application of neuro-evidence still holds promise for the
future of the interconnection between neuroscience and law.
1

Deborah W. Denno, The Myth of the Double-Edged Sword: An Empirical Study of
Neuroscience Evidence in Criminal Cases, 56 B.C.L. REV. 493 (2015).
2
Owen D. Jones & Francis X. Shen, Law and Neuroscience in the United States, INT’L
NEUROLAW 349, 380 (2011).
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I.
OVERVIEW OF THE APPLICATION OF
NEUROSCIENCE IN COURTS
A.

The Trends of Neuroscience in Courts
“Neuroscience” here primarily refers to the study of brain structures,

functions, developments, and abnormalities. It is often used to help
practitioners make references to people’s cognitive functions and explain
behavioral patterns, such as criminal behaviors.3
Neuroscientific evidence has been used increasingly in both U.S. courts
and other legal contexts during the past decade. 4 In 2010, United States v.
Semrau involved the first evidentiary hearing on the admission of functional
MRI (fMRI) lie-detection evidence in federal court.5 State v. Nelson was the
first case to admit quantitative electroencephalography (qEEG) evidence,
which had a mitigating effect on a sentencing decision.6 Furthermore,
Graham v. Florida explicitly endorsed using brain development research in
courtrooms, particularly for sentencing decisions.7 In 2016, the applications
of neuroscience in legal contexts further expanded. State v. Montgomery
brought up the retroactivity of legal rulings related to neuroscience and
adolescent brain development.8 In addition to these examples, a preliminary

3

Stephen J. Morse, Neuroscience, Free Will, And Criminal Responsibility, U. PA. L.:
LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP REPOSITORY 251, 256 (2015).
4
Id.
5
See United States v. Semrau, 693 F.3d 510 (6th Cir. 2012) (In late 2009, Dr. Semrau’s
attorney and Dr. J. Houston Gordon contacted Dr. Laken to inquire about having an fMRIbased lie detection test conducted on Dr. Semrau in hopes of bolstering the defenses that
Dr. Semrau lacked intent to defraud and undertook actions to ensure proper billing
compliance).
6
Florida v. Nelson, No. F05-0846 (11 Fla. Cir. Ct., 2010); Owen D. Jones et al., Law and
Neuroscience, 33 J. NEUROSCIENCE 17624, 17625 (2013).
7
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (ruling that life without parole is unconstitutional
for individuals under the age of eighteen years convicted of crimes other than homicide).
8
State v. Montgomery, 194 So. 3d 606 (La. 2016) (individuals sentenced to life without
parole as juveniles prior to Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), were entitled to
resentencing or a parole hearing).
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analysis by Nita Farahany reveals that the number of reported cases involving
neuroscientific evidence in 2012 was more than twice what it was in 2005. 9
As neuroimaging techniques have advanced in the twenty-first century,
there has also been an exponential increase of important developments on the
intersection between neuroscience and law and the emergence of new neurodisciplines, such as “neuro-law” and “neuro-ethics.”10 In 2009, more than
200 published academic articles mentioned neuroscience, with the law
review articles related to neuroscience having a fourfold increase.11
Although this inter-discipline between neuroscience and law sparks vivid
interest from both researchers and practitioners, whether and how to apply
and expand neuro-evidence in the legal system is still an open and widly
debated topic. Based on its scientific applications on normative and legal
systems, a large number of critiques focus on how different bio-technologies
and analytic methods can apply to legal contexts and ultimately foster a more
effective and fair criminal justice system.12 Many empirical studies and
research projects have explored the impacts of brain-image technologies on
a variety of social and legal problems, such as lie-detection in the courtroom,
functional connectivity analysis of impulsivity, risk assessment for people
with substance use disorder, the effect of neuroimaging on jury’s decisions,
and third-party legal decision-making processes.13 Nonetheless, it is still
theoretically and empirically unclear how the legal system, especially at the
courtroom level, should or should not evaluate the mitigating or aggravating
effects of neuro-evidence on sentencing decisions.

9

Nita A. Farahany, Neuroscience and Behavioral Genetics in US Criminal Law: an
Empirical Analysis, 2 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 485, 485–509 (2015).
10
Stephen J. Morse, Neuroethics: Neurolaw (2016), in Oxford Handbooks Online (2017),
U of Penn Law School, Public Law Research Paper No. 17-9. (2016).
11
Francis X. Shen, The Law and Neuroscience Bibliography: Navigating the Emerging
Field of Neurolaw, 38.3 INT’L J.L. INFO. 352 (2010).
12
See Jones & Shen, supra note 2.
13
Id., at 352–53.
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Theoretically, some may consider neuroimaging evidence as a mitigating
factor because it challenges the mens rea and thus the legal culpability of
criminals. In contrast, others may use it as a predictive tool for future offenses
and people’s inability to be rehabilitated, and hence consider it an
aggravating factor. Although empirically testing the use of neuroscience in
courtrooms is difficult, a few studies have performed experiments. 14 Findings
are generally mixed and inconclusive.15 However, a recent empirical analysis
by Deborah Denno reveals this seemingly double–edged sword to be a myth
by stating that neuroscience evidence used in traditional criminal courts
usually mitigates punishments, particularly for death penalty sentences. 16
Neuroscience has been used in a variety of legal and criminal contexts,
such as constitutional law, contract law, and disability benefit claims. For
example, the Supreme Court stated that violent video games are associated
with adolescent aggression by citing a “cutting-edge neuroscience study.”17
A defendant was able to void a land contract by providing brain scans to show
his mental incompetency.18 Additionally, a professional football player
offered his brain images to demonstrate his eligibility for neuro-degenerative
disability benefits.19 Undeniably, the fundamental concern related to neurolaw is at the guilt-or-innocence determination phase of a case. Since neuroevidence utilization in sentencing has received less academic and public
attention, this article discusses neuro-evidence as a mitigation instrument in
the sentencing stage and its implications, causations, and future challenges.20

14

Darby Aono, Gideon Yaffe & Hedy Kober, Neuroscientific evidence in the courtroom:
a review, 4 COGNITIVE RES.: PRINCIPLES & IMPLICATIONS 40 (2019).
15
Id., at 5.
16
Denno, supra note 1, at 493.
17
Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011) (holding that video games were
protected speech under the First Amendment as other forms of media).
18
Van Middlesworth v. Century Bank & Tr. Co., No. 215512, 2000 Mich. App. LEXIS
2369 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000).
19
Boyd v. Bell, 410 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2005).
20
Stephen J. Morse, Criminal Law and Common Sense: An Essay on the Perils and
Promise of Neuroscience, 99 MARQ. L. REV. 39 (2015).
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B.

The Challenges of Neuroscience on Sentencing Decisions
Although neuro-evidence is often used to challenge the underlying

assumptions of voluntariness and mental state in criminal law, it has been
much less helpful for determinations of guilt or innocence. 21 Some
proponents, including researchers, defense lawyers, defendants, and the
media, have endorsed neuro-evidence and advocate for the use of such
evidence by juries, prosecutors, and judges to establish criminal
responsibility.22 On the other hand, opponents argue that the reliability,
validity, and psychological inferences of neuroscience in criminal decisions
are far from obvious and determinant because researchers can never find a
brain region explicitly indicating mens rea and responsibility.23 Schweitzer
and colleagues have conducted a series of experiments to examine the
influence of neuro-evidence on several aspects of criminal proceedings in
support of a mens rea defense.24 They found no consistent impact of neuroevidence on jury verdicts, sentence recommendations, or other legal
decision-making processes.25 With a brief overview of how neuro-evidence
functions in determining guilt or innocence, this review focuses on its impact
at the sentencing phrase.
Neuro-evidence has also been involved in, and will continue to influence,
sentencing decisions with its general mitigating effect, especially in death
penalty cases.26 Determining sentences for criminals is complex, depends on

21

Farahany, supra note 9, at 501.
Eyal Aharoni et al., Can Neurological Evidence Help Courts Assess Criminal
Responsibility? Lessons from Law and Neuroscience, 1124.1 ANNALS N.Y. ACADEMY
SCI. 145 (2008).
23
Id.
24
Nicholas J. Schweitzer et al., Neuroimages as Evidence in a Mens Rea Defense: No
Impact, 17 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL’Y & L. 357 (2011).
25
Id.
26
Farahany, supra note 9, at 486.
22
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various factors, and varies by states. 27 In capital punishment cases, although
the jury decides to recommend either death or life in prison, judges are
generally the ones to make final sentencing decisions.28 In criminal law and
the philosophy of punishment of a crime, proportionality to the severity of
the crime itself is crucial to ensure justice, also referred to as proportional
justice.29 When determining a proportional punishment for a crime or a
criminal, judges evaluate both mitigating and aggravating circumstances, at
least considering mens rea (criminal intent) and actus reus (actual
behaviors).30 Therefore, the argument, “I didn’t do it—my brain made me do
it,” challenges the severity of mens rea and the culprit’s criminal
responsibility, as well as the principle of proportional justice, in the
sentencing phase.31
Generally, neuroscientific evidence is used in cases where defendants are
facing a severe sentence, such as the death penalty, a life sentence, or a
substantial prison sentence.32 One of the best-known uses of neuroscience in
criminal trials is Roper v. Simmons,33 which ruled out the death penalty for
adolescents younger than eighteen who committed crimes due to brain
developments and dysfunctions.34 Since then, the use of brain imaging data

27

NEAL B. KAUDER & BRIAN J. OSTROM, STATE SENTENCING GUIDELINES: PROFILES
CONTINUUM (2008), https://www.issuelab.org/resource/state-sentencing-guidelinesprofiles-and-continuum.html [https://perma.cc/MD79-AEEW].
28
Lisa G. Aspinwal et al., The Double-Edged Sword: Does Biomechanism Increase or
Decrease Judges’ Sentencing of Psychopaths? 337 SCI. 846–849 (2012) (in supplementary
materials).
29
John Deigh, Punishment and Proportionality, 33 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 185, 199 (2014).
30
Barry C. Field, Adolescent Criminal Responsibility, Proportionality, and Sentencing
Policy: Roper, Graham, Miller/Jackson, and the Youth Discount, 31 L. & INEQ. 263
(2012).
31
Farahany, supra note 9, at 494.
32
Although there is a debate between capital punishment and its proportional nature, it is
not the current focus of this review. See generally Andrew von Hirsch, Proportionality in
the Philosophy of Punishment: From “Why Punish” to “How much?”, 1 CRIM. L.F. 259,
266 (1990).
33
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
34
Field, supra note 30, at 272.
AND
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as a tool to reduce responsibility, sentencing severity, or both for criminal
offenders has not only prevailed but also raised a hot legal debate. 35 The focus
of the debate is on how neuro-evidence would and should impact the
sentencing decisions of capital cases based on the principle of proportional
justice.36
The scientific inference of neuro-evidence and its impact on the sentencing
stage of a capital case tends to have a few obstacles to overcome. Historically,
retribution, rehabilitation, deterrence, and incapacitation are the four corners
of sentencing law.37 When sentencing in criminal court, a judge has to apply
a wide range of factors to make appropriate sentencing decisions. 38 The
principle of proportionality in sentencing is crucial to balance between
rehabilitation and punishment, to achieve fairness and justice when all of the
circumstances are taken into account.39 Since neuro-evidence challenges the
notion of criminal responsibility, it inevitably raises concerns for sentencing
proportionality and leniency in capital cases.40
To decide whether to impose a sentence of death or life in prison, judges,
along with jurors, are required to make decisions about whether “the totality
of the mitigating factors is sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.” 41
Although evidence of brain damage or dysfunctionality may not be sufficient
to exculpate an offender from criminal liability (in the guilt phase), it is still
highly likely to be used to determine appropriate sentences, specifically in
decisions between the death penalty and life without parole.42 The penal
35

Denno, supra note 1, at 495.
Id.
37
Doris Layton Mackenzie, Sentencing and Corrections in the 21st Century: Setting the
Stage for the Future, NCJRS (2001), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/189106-2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C8TU-EVUB].
38
Id.
39
Elizabeth Bennett, Neuroscience and Criminal Law: Have We Been Getting It Wrong
for Centuries and Where Do We Go from Here, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 437, 452 (2016);
see supra note 9.
40
Denno, supra note 1, at 526.
41
Bennet, supra note 39.
42
Id. at 448.
36
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system has an independent obligation to determine and question whether
death is the appropriate punishment for the crime.43
Researchers have indicated that brain scans can be used to identify and
support defendants’ claims of diminished culpability due to circumstances
beyond their control or free will in capital cases.44 Empirically, a jury
simulation experiment, which tested the influence of neuropsychological
evidence on sentencing recommendations in death penalty hearings, found
that neuropsychological evidence reduced the frequency of death penalty
recommendations.45 It seems that attempts to use neuroscientific evidence at
the sentencing phase are far more influential than attempts at the liability
(guilt or innocence) phase.46

II.
COMPARISON BETWEEN TWO CONCRETE LEGAL
CASES
A.

State of Florida v. Hoskins (2007): Sentence of Death
In 1992, Johnny Hoskins was accused of raping and murdering his eighty-

year-old neighbor, Dorothy Berger.47 Both eyewitness accounts and DNA
analysis of semen revealed that Hoskins was the suspect.48 Before the second
penalty phase proceeding of his trial, the trial judge denied Hoskins’ mental
health expert’s request for a neurological test to develop mitigating
evidence.49 Hoskins was convicted of first-degree murder, burglary of a
dwelling, sexual battery with physical force, kidnapping, and robbery, and

43

See generally Philmore v. State, 820 So. 2d 919, 939-40 (Fla. 2002).
See Farah Focquaert, Andrea L. Glenn, and Adrian Raine, Free Will, Responsibility,
and the Punishment of Criminals, FUTURE PUNISHMENT & RETRIBUTION 247, 259–260
(Thomas A. Nadelhoffer ed., 2013).
45
Greene, Edith, and Brian S. Cahill, Effects of Neuroimaging Evidence on Mock Juror
Decision Making, 30(3) BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 280 (2012).
46
Denno, supra note 1, at 499.
47
Hoskins v. State, 702 So. 2d 202, 203–204 (Fla. 1997).
48
Id.
49
Id.
44
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was sentenced to death.50 The Supreme Court of Florida ordered the trial
court to order a PET scan on Hoskins and evaluate the results, and because
the PET scan showed a brain abnormality, the Supreme Court of Florida
remanded the case for a new penalty phase proceeding.51 In the new penalty
phase proceeding, the jury recommended death by a vote of eleven to one. 52
Although Hoskins raised six claims for appeal, his death sentence was
ultimately upheld in 2007.53 This review will focus on his claim about
problematic considerations of aggravators and statutory mental mitigators in
his sentencing decision.
In the presence of neuro-evidence, the trial court concluded that Hoskins
had a hypo-frontal lobe abnormality that could result in a reduced ability to
control impulsivity.54 Still, it was not a “mental or emotional disturbance,”
so it could not serve as a statutory mental mitigator.55 Furthermore, Hoskins
argued that he lacked the mental and emotional maturity to control his
behaviors due to his brain abnormality and his mental age.56 The trial court
found that there might have been evidence to support this argument in terms
of rape, but there was clearly no evidence to support this in relation to
murder.57

50

Id.
Hoskins v. State, 965 So. 2d 1, 6 (Fla. 2007).
52
Id at 6.
53
Id. at 7 (Hoskins’s six claims were as follows: “(1) the trial court erred in overruling his
objection to the State’s use of a peremptory challenge to an African-American juror; (2)
the trial court erred in limiting Hoskins’s voir dire examination regarding the potential
jurors’ ability to consider “gory photographs” which were already in evidence; (3) the trial
court erred in failing to give the requested limiting instruction on victim impact evidence
at the time of introduction; (4) the trial court erred in denying Hoskins’s requested jury
instructions; (5) the trial court included improper aggravating circumstances, excluded
existing mitigating circumstances, and failed to properly find that the mitigating
circumstances outweighed the aggravating circumstances; and (6) Florida’s capital
sentencing process is unconstitutional”).
54
Id., at 17.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
51
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The defendant’s expert even testified that, while the frontal lobe
impairment might explain the rape, there was no link between his brain
impairment and his subsequent murder.58 According to his expert’s
testimony, trying to avoid detection and covering up his crime showed that
Hoskins knew what he did was wrong.59 Hoskins’ behavioral evidence
outweighed his mental immaturity and brain dysfunctions; thus, the
prosecutor argued that a series of Hoskins’ behaviors showed elements of
planning, indicating that he had a coherent and well-conceived plan.60 Even
though there were sixteen mitigating circumstances, the court found that low
IQ, low mental functional ability, brain abnormalities, and mental age
were non-statutory mitigators.61 Therefore, there was no evidence that he
could not have “appreciate[d] the criminality of his conduct” at the time of
the murder, and the court, therefore, upheld the rejection of this mental
mitigator.62

58

Id. at 18.
Id. (Hoskins’s purposeful actions in binding and gagging Ms. Berger before placing her
in the trunk, driving to his parents’ home six hours away, borrowing a shovel, driving to a
remote area where he killed Ms. Berger, and then telling his brother he hit a possum when
blood was noticed dripping from the rear wheel well were indicative of someone who
knows his conduct is wrong).
60
Id. (“Hoskins placed Ms. Berger in the trunk of the car, drove approximately six hours
(stopping for gas and to change a fuse), stopped at his parents’ house to borrow a shovel,
drove to a remote location nearby, and eventually killed Ms. Berger by manual
strangulation”).
61
Id., at 6, 17–18 (The mitigating circumstances were: “(1) the Defendant formed and
maintained loving relationships with his family; (2) the Defendant was a father figure to
his siblings; (3) the Defendant protected his mother from his father’s abuse; (4) low IQ;
(5) low mental functional ability; (6) some abnormalities in the brain which may cause
some impairment; (7) an impoverished and abusive background; (8) mental age equivalent
(between fifteen and twenty-five); (9) the Defendant helped support his family financially;
(10) the Defendant had and cared for many pets; (11) no disciplinary problems in school;
(12) the Defendant suffered from poor academic performance and left school at age sixteen
to work to help his family; (13) the Defendant was not malingering; (14) the Defendant
expressed remorse; (15) potential for rehabilitation and lack of future dangerousness; and
(16) good jail conduct, including death row behavior”).
62
Id. at 18.
59
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The court’s weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors was an
important part of the process when sentencing Hoskins. Overall, the court
discovered one statutory mitigator, fifteen non-statutory mitigators, and three
aggravators.63 The court indicated that any one of the aggravators, standing
alone, far outweighed all of the mitigators.64 In addition, the jury agreed that
Hoskins’ crime was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC) because
the victim was conscious before Hoskins hit and strangulated her.65 The
aggravating factor (HAC) of the offender’s indifference, indicated by
strangulation of a conscious murder victim, outweighed all previous
mitigators including the brain scan.66 The court found the death sentence was
proportional.67 In Hoskins’ case, introducing a brain scan did not change the
final sentencing decision.
B.

State of Florida v. Nelson (2010): Sentence to Life without Parole
In 2005, Grady Nelson, a former county social worker’s aide, was

convicted of first-degree murder after he brutally stabbed his wife sixty-one
times and raped his step-children in Miami-Dade County, Florida.68 Nelson
even left a butcher knife in his wife’s head.69 Despite his heinous crimes, the

63

Id. at 6, 18 (The three aggravators were as follows: “(1) the capital felony was
committed during the course of or in flight after committing the crimes of robbery, sexual
battery, or kidnapping; (2) the capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or
preventing a lawful arrest; and (3) the capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel (HAC)”).
64
Id. at 19; see also Rogers v. State, 511 So. 2d 526, 533–535 (Fla. 1987) (the court
recognizes that one mitigating factor was established but that did not outweigh the two
aggravating circumstances).
65
See Hoskins v. State, 965 So. 2d 1, 21 (Fla. 2007).
66
Id. at 19.
67
Id. at 22.
68
David Ovalle, Miami-Dade Jury: Man Guilty of Murdering His Wife, THE PALM
BEACH
POST (2012),
https://www.palmbeachpost.com/article/20100710/NEWS/
812024762.
69
Owen D. Jones et al., Neuroscientists in Court, 14 NATURE REVS. NEUROSCIENCE 730,
730 (2013).
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jury decided to sentence him to life in prison without parole.70 One of the
major factors influencing this sentencing decision was neuroscientific
evidence, quantitative electroencephalography (qEEG), offered by his
defense attorney and introduced by a neuroscientist as expert testimony. 71
QEEG is a brain mapping technique that translates a patient’s brain wave
frequencies into a digital image of their brain.72 This neuro-evidence revealed
that Nelson had a brain abnormality or damage that had the potential to make
him prone to impulsivity and violence.73 His attorney insisted that although
the neuro-evidence might not leave Nelson excusable or criminally
irresponsible, it should mitigate his punishment.74
In order to sentence Nelson to death, the majority of the twelve jurors had
to vote in favor of it.75 However, the punishment vote was evenly split, six to
six, which resulted in an automatic life sentence. 76 A follow-up interview
with jurors indicated that the neuro-evidence did play a crucial role in their
sentencing decisions; two jurors explicitly mentioned that the qEEG evidence
changed their minds from favoring execution.77 One juror said she leaned
toward the death sentence until the neuroscience evidence was presented. 78
Similarly, the other juror indicated that he was ready to recommend death for

70

Terry Lenamon & Reba Kennedy, QEEG Brain Mapping Evidence and Mitigation in
South Florida’s Grady Nelson Trial, DEATH PENALTY (2010), https://www.
deathpenaltyblog.com/qeeg-brain-mapping-evidence-and-mitigation-in-south-floridasgrady-nelson-trial/ [https://perma.cc/PE8P-DPRS].
71
Id.
72
Rachel Monroe, A Map That Shows You Everything Wrong with Your Brain, ATLANTIC
(June 29, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2017/06/this-is-your-brainon-qeeg/532035/ [https://perma.cc/5SH9-ZB7A].
73
Jones et al., supra note 69.
74
Id. at 730.
75
Id. at 734.
76
Id.
77
Greg Miller, Brain Exam May Have Swayed Jury in Sentencing Convicted Murderer,
AM ASS’N FOR ADVANCEMENT SCI. (Dec. 14, 2010), http://news.sciencemag.org/
technology/2010/12/brain-exam-may-have-swayed-jury-sentencing-convicted-murderer
[https://perma.cc/LU8X-NJ4Q].
78
Id.
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Nelson, but the qEEG swayed his decision.79 Specifically, he said: “After
seeing the brain scans, I was convinced this guy had some sort of brain
problem.”80 In Nelson’s case, the presence of neuro-evidence diminished his
punishment by implying a brain dysfunction and mental incapacity, which
ultimately dissuaded the jury from voting for the death sentence. 81
C.

A Comparative Analysis of Different Outcomes
The Hoskins and Nelson cases have similarities, but the handling of

neuroscience evidence has led to different sentencing results. These two
cases are comparable because both occurred in Florida, both involved murder
and rape, and both had their brain images, revealing frontal lobe impairments,
presented as a mitigator. Both defendants are black males and their victims
were females.82 To explain the difference in their sentences, I will analyze
the following four aspects: (1) initial acceptance of neuro-evidence; (2)
neuro-evidence with ineffective expert testimonies; (3) behavioral
aggravators in the commission of a crime; and (4) the presentation of
different technologies or brain images.
1.

Initial Acceptance of Neuro-Evidence
As time goes by and technology advances, the interconnection between

neuroscience and law is developing exponentially, receiving academic,
political, and public attention. It seems that the legal zeitgeist of acceptance
of neuro-evidence as criminal mitigation in 2007 was quite different than in
2010, with more positive attitudes in 2010. In Hoskins’ case, the court
initially denied the presence of his PET scan and only later accepted it after
79
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an appeal and another hearing; but this was not the case in Nelson, in which
the court allowed the use of neuro-evidence in the first place.83 Initial
reactions to the presence of neuro-evidence as a mitigator reflect the legal
culture and the degree of understanding of the relationship between
neuroscience and criminal responsibility at that time. Due to an incomplete
understanding of Hoskins’ brain impairment and reluctant acceptance of his
brain scan as a mitigator in the first place, the judge and jurors remained
unpersuaded by the argument in favor of diminished criminal responsibility.
In contrast, the formal admissibility of Nelson’s qEEG result may have
increased its perceived credibility in the eyes of jurors, thus increasing its
mitigating effect. Therefore, the future admissibility of neuro-evidence,
which influences how legal actors evaluate and weigh its persuasiveness,
could be dependent on the court’s current interpretation of the relationship
between law and neuroscience.
2.

Neuro-Evidence with Expert Testimonies
Defense attorneys have an obligation to conduct a “thorough

investigation” of “all reasonably available mitigating evidence” for
defendants facing the death penalty.84 Courts repeatedly emphasize that one
important mitigator is the defendants’ cognitive and intellectual
deficiencies.85 Generally, a neuro-evidence expert talks about the results of
neuropsychological and computerized neurocognitive tests, explains
structural and functional imaging, and then draws conclusions regarding the
meaning of specific brain impairments.86 Determining the etiology of
83

Jones et al., supra note 69, at 730; Hoskins v. State, 702 So.2d at 203 (Fla. 1997).
See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003) (stating that defense counsel’s
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abnormalities or dysfunctions can be difficult because doing so requires
clinical evaluation and integration with other medical and neurological
histories.87 When a neuroscientific expert is asked to offer opinions in the
legal context, at a minimum, they must testify about what they know, remain
updated in the field, and utilize the mitigating factors. 88 Their testimonies on
neuroimaging findings must meet standards of scientific validity. 89 As
mentioned before, neuroscience evidence is an influential mitigating factor
for some jurors, which can lead to life in prison rather than to the death of a
defendant.90
In Hoskins’ case, although a PET scan showing his frontal lobe
impairment was presented, the expert neither made an association between
brain damage and the murder nor offered the mitigating effect. On the other
hand, the defense attorney and the expert for Nelson’s case supported the
correlation between brain impairment and Nelson’s violent behaviors. 91
Since the procedure for preparing expert testimony and reporting the
neuroimaging findings is complicated, the expert testimony tends to be
persuasive.92 Non-expert jurors weigh such experts’ testimonies alongside
other evidence, which is presented by both sides.93 Therefore, the statements
made by neuroscience experts can be influential for both the judge and jury
to determine the final sentence.
3.

Behavioral Aggravators in the Commission of a Crime
Both the Hoskins and Nelson case involved an overwhelming number of

horrendous aggravators. However, one noticeable difference manifested in
87
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the type of behavioral aggravators. Hoskins showed a clear intention to avoid
detection and tried to cover up his crime, whereas Nelson did not; instead, he
confessed the first opportunity. In Hoskins’s case, the jury revealed the
following three aggravating circumstances:
• The capital felony was committed during the course of or in flight
after committing the crimes of robbery, sexual battery, or
kidnapping with a vote of twelve to zero;
• The capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or
preventing a lawful arrest with a vote of twelve to zero; and
• The capital felony was heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC) with a vote
of ten to two.94
The jury and court indicated that any one of the aggravators alone far
outweighed all of the mitigating factors.95
It seems that the folk-psychological model of criminal responsibility is still
central to explaining human behavior in a legal context.96 Scientific findings,
whether from neuroscience or other sciences, will only be useful if they help
to validate and clarify the law’s normative-psychological standards.97 These
two different sentencing results are consistent with the notion that we hold
people and their behaviors responsible and punishable, not their brains;
“therefore, actions speak louder than images.”98 Besides, neuroscience can
hardly identify the presence, absence, or diminished level of specific mens
rea, let alone rely on technology to predict future dangerous or criminal
behaviors or recidivism.99
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Hoskins v. State, 965 So. 2d 1, 6 (Fla. 2007).
Id. at 19.
Morse, supra note 3, at 256.
Id. at 253.
Id. at 268.
Id. at 274.
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4.

The Presentation of Different Technologies
Although it is nearly impossible to conclude that a specific brain region

controls a particular behavior or human function, research continues to make
relative inferences. A PET scan uses radioactive tracers to detect increased
blood activities within the brain.100 It can pinpoint and evaluate brain
abnormalities.101 However, the brain image is rough and challenging to
interpret.102 As discussed earlier, qEEG is a brain mapping technique using
people’s brain electrical frequencies to determine a specific pathology,
different activity pattern, or deviation from the norm; its visual presentation
seems to be quantitative, clear, and compelling for laypeople. 103 Although it
is uncertain whether differing visual presentations of neuro-evidence
influence qEEG’s perceived believability and persuasiveness, its impact, on
jury’s and judges’ evaluations and sentencing recommendations may still
have a real effect.104

III.
CRITICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR USING
NEUROSCIENCE EVIDENCE
A.

Reliability and Psychological Inference of Brain-Image Technology
While the interconnection between neuroscience and law is promising and

rapidly developing, there are several critical methodological cautions with
neuro-technologies and their implications in legal contexts. There are many
types of brain imaging techniques, with many accompanying ways to be
interpreted and presented.105 For example, PET scans use radioactive tracers
100
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to detect blood concentrations in different brain regions which are associated
with brain functions; an electroencephalogram (EEG) analyzes event-related
potentials (ERP) to estimate brain processes underlying perceptual,
cognitive, and motor activities; and functional MRI detects changes in
hemodynamic properties of the brain which typically occur when engaging
in particular mental tasks.106 Although it is rare, there is a famous example
where neuroscientists go “fishing” for results, and there may be more that is
uncovered or unreported.107 The reliability of neuro-technologies can also be
compromised

by

inappropriate

experimental

protocols,

incompetence, inaccurate interpretation, and so forth.

108

operational

It is vital to bear in

mind that brain images are the result of a process within a process.109 In other
words, many decisions and steps are involved in determining exactly when
and what data should be collected and how the data should be analyzed and
presented.110 The room for technical and statistical mistakes and
misinterpretations can be significant.111 Thus, complex neuro-technologies
may or may not be reliable, generalizable, and replicable.112
Another significant concern is the psychological inference of neuroimages: whether the brain image can make a statement about one’s mens rea
and actus reus in legal contexts. First, brain images do not speak the
significance and inference for themselves. Even well-designed, wellexecuted, properly analyzed, and properly presented brain images must be

106
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see Louisa Lyon, Dead salmon and voodoo correlations: should we be skeptical about
functional MRI? 140 BRAIN 1–5 (2017).
108
Jacqueline Sullivan, Experimentation in Cognitive Neuroscience and Cognitive
Neurobiology, HANDBOOK OF NEUROETHICS 31–47 (2015).
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interpreted in the correct context.113 Second, neuro-images only show brain
activations for specific tasks but do not indicate particular types of thoughts
that require a series of inferential steps. 114 Many brain regions are involved
in a wide variety of functions.115 Correlation between brain abnormalities and
violent behaviors is not causation because other explanations can exist. 116
Third, identifying structural abnormalities in the brain, dysfunction, and
dysfunctional connectivity is complicated and subject to enormous variation.
To say precisely “how uncommon a given feature or functional pattern could
be, even if it appears to be atypical” is challenging.117 And we do not know
the base rates for the connection between a brain abnormality, mental
incapacities, and problematic behavioral manifestations.118
Finally, the meaning of brain images is not straightforward or self-evident.
Inferring its psychological significance depends not only on the expert
analysis but also on the specific context in court.119 Usually, a brain scan is
required long after the criminal activity. People’s brains do change with time
and interact with experiences.120 For instance, decreased brain activation may
result either from a cognitive impairment or less cognitive effort.121
Additionally, some brain regions may become structurally or functionally
abnormal during the time between crime and arrest.122 How to make sure the
same mindset or brain damage occurs during the criminal activities is unclear,
thus making the causal inferences and psychological significance more
complicated.
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In sum, methodological cautions, such as voxel detection for statistical
significance, estimation of effect size, technology reliability, and the
subsequent challenge of making legal and psychological inferences are
pronounced.123 Researchers who specialize in the intersection of
neuroscience and law have acknowledged and studied these potential
issues.124 Instead of entirely preventing the use of neuro-evidence, its
application should be careful, specialized, and context-specific.125
B.

Admissibility and the Translation to Courts
The application of neuroscience in the courtroom has, will, and should

vary by context.126 During the last decade, neuro-evidence has been accepted
as a mitigator in sentencing decisions of a variety of types, such as fMRI,
EEG, qEEG, PET scan, and others.127 Currently, more brain imaging
technologies have developed, but their applications in courts creates
difficulties for judges and juries.128 The criteria for admissibility, appropriate
interpretations, proper visual presentations, and potential mitigating impacts
on juries and judges are all challenging, uncertain, and require more cautious
evaluations.129 Since the admissibility of neuro-evidence in courts is highly
context-specific, more research and evidence are needed to supplement the
existing standards.130
123
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Neuroscience is valuable not because it creates something new but instead
because it explains the normative behaviors and folk-psychological concepts
within the legally relevant domain. As mentioned in the previous section, the
translation of brain, mind, and behavior in legal contexts is one of the most
challenging problems.131 We still do not know how neuro-images, mental
states, and actions are related, nor how the brain specializes or works
generally.132 The legal relevance of neuroscience is limited,133 let alone its
translation into capital punishment cases. Consequently, neuro-evidence
admissibility may require caution and regulations.
C.

Persuasiveness and Neuro-Exuberance
The concept of neuroscience, by its nature, tends to be inherently

persuasive and influential.134 For juries and judges who do not understand the
science behind neuro-research, neuroscience tends to have its technological
“hotness” which can inflate its persuasive power and legal relevance in
sentencing.135 Some experts believe that neuroscience is attractive because
many legal professionals think it can be a useful supplement to traditional
social science, and, in some contexts, it is even “more objective and
powerful.”136 In this way, neuro-evidence can be potentially over-persuasive
and allow juries and judges to draw legal inferences that are mistakenly
understood or challenged by specialized researchers.137 As a result, legal

scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts
or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the
expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.”).
131
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132
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agencies should be more cautious about the inherent persuasiveness of neuroevidence in courtrooms.
Moreover, advances in neuroimaging technologies partially contribute to
a source of the neuro-exuberance.138 Because of the fanciness and the
artificial colorfulness of those neuro-technologies, they are more likely to be
convincing about their implications within conceptual and legal aspects. 139
Dr. Stephen Morse has termed this phenomenon as “brain overclaim
syndrome (BOS)” in order to prevent misuse of the term “neuro-evidence.”140
When facing these neuroscience information, people tend to be fascinated
and exaggerate their persuasive power.141 Since most people are against the
ideology and practice of retributive justice, they may hope neuroscience
becomes powerful enough to convince law and policymakers that current
crime control strategies are not sufficient.142 Consequently, the only logical
solution seems to be that the criminal justice system should turn its attention
to prevention programs, social control, and social justice.143
Newspapers and other media outlets increasingly report on neuroscience
findings and their applications in courts for the public with inaccurate
narratives.144 However, the ways in which the media report this information
need to be taken with a large grain of salt.145 The media may oversimplify or
distort the neuroscience knowledge behind the case, thereby leading to a
misunderstanding or mis-conclusion by the public.
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In addition, the professional language or jargon used in both law and
neuroscience can lead to an epistemic ignorance.146 This ignorance not only
affects people’s judgments and evaluation of neuroscientific information, but
also makes the neuro-evidence more persuasive, even beyond what is
actually merited by the data.147 Some researchers have even found that
neuroscience

information

containing

inaccurate

explanations

of

psychological significance tends to be more satisfying than that indicating
guilty verdicts in a mock trial.148 Thus, the credibility, reasoning, and
application of neuro-evidence in the courtroom require critical and cautious
evaluations to avoid over-inference because no science, including
neuroscience and behavioral genetics, can prove or disprove the existence of
free will and mens rea.149

IV.
A.

A NEW WAY FORWARD AND IMPLICATIONS
Proposal for Guidelines of Neuro–Evidence

People tend to find neuro-evidence more intriguing and convincing than
other types of evidence.150 Without a formal and standardized protocol,
neuro-evidence will likely be misused and misunderstood.151 Several
possible guidelines are offered below to address the foregoing concerns. The
application of neuro-evidence to sentencing decisions, particularly for capital
cases, may be improved by following these seven suggestions.
Suggestion 1. When requiring neuro-evidence as a mitigator, brain images
must be obtained by qualified professionals who must hold their PhD or M.D.
in relevant disciplines, such as cognitive psychology, neuroscience, or
146
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psychiatry. They must also have at least five years of experience in doing
related research and practice.
Suggestion 2. Due to the salience of visual features, such as the colorcoding within brain scan images, brain images should be presented with only
dark colors (i.e., greyblack spectrum) in front of juries and judges. Darkcolored images aim to eliminate the potential bias stemmed from visual
attractiveness.
Suggestion 3. Brain images also must be analyzed, interpreted, and
presented by qualified experts. Because of the adversarial nature of the court
system, it is better to ask for expert testimonies from both sides (i.e.,
prosecutor and defense attorney) to ensure equity and justice. If only one
party presented neuro-evidence as a tool for pursuing its favored sentencing
outcomes, juries and judges might (even unintentionally) offer biased
recommendations and decisions.
Suggestion 4. Before presenting neuro-evidence in court, academic
researchers and practitioners must give jurors and judges a brief science
education. They should offer, at most, a one-page document or a five-minute
talk in plain English to explain the nature of neuroscientific inferences. They
should also actively let juries and judges know about the general “promise
and potential pitfalls” of neuroscience research and its limited implications
in the legal context.152 After all, people with the same diagnoses or brain
damages can behave differently, and ultimately, it is the behavior that is
legally relevant, not the brain.153 Without acknowledging both appropriate
inferences and drawbacks of neuro-evidence, jurors cannot make fair and
well-informed decisions.
Suggestion 5. When jurors evaluate the neuro-evidence as a mitigator in
final sentencing recommendations, the court should recommend that each
juror vote on its mitigating effect. As a result, when the judge decides final
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sentencing, they will be able to weigh and critically evaluate the mitigating
impacts of neuroscientific evidence. The judge can make sentencing
decisions based on the vote ratio as sentencing recommendations in criminal
trials do not need a unanimous jury vote. This suggestion provides an
alternative option for judges to correct observed biases from jurors’
decisions.
Suggestion 6. Since the brain changes over time, the court should request
new neuro-evidence, or brain images, if the defendant appeals and requests a
resentencing hearing. That way, judges and jurors can make judgments
informed by either the stability or changes of the brain impairments that were
evaluated in previous sentencing decisions. If new brain images reveal
significant signs of a reduced risk factor (i.e., more functional connectivity
in the prefrontal cortex) or a lesser degree of impairment, judges and jurors
may consider resentencing. In addition, to ensure the integrity of the
proceedings, attorneys should recruit new experts to analyze and interpret the
brain scans. If the same experts are used, they may unintentionally be biased
or over-interpret the neuro-evidence due to their previous exposure to the
case. Whenever resentencing is mentioned, we should proceed with extreme
caution when using either contemporary or outdated evidence.
Suggestion 7. Although neuro-evidence is compelling and persuasive, it
must be accompanied by other psychological and behavioral assessments to
determine criminal responsibility and sentencing decisions. One example
would be the MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool-Criminal
Adjudication (MacCAT-CA).154 Using a vignette of a crime situations, the
tool asks a defendant questions about the scenario and his or her own
situation.155 Although the MacCAT-CA is primarily used for assessing
competency to stand trial, its ability to capture a defendant’s cognitive level
154
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and reasoning ability is the primary focus here. In addition, the Minnesota
Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI-2) can detect malingering and
feigned cognitive impairment.156 Practitioners should use multiple
measurements to evaluate the inferences concluded from neuro-evidence.157
After all, the application of neuroscience in law should explain the normative
and behavioral phenomena.158
In short, neuroscience is a vital tool in making decisions in legal contexts.
However, only under proper and formal guidelines can neuro-evidence
application ensure fairness. These suggestions make sense, given the
concerns about over-interpretation and mis-inferences of neuroscience
information in courts. It is important to remember that the legal standards for
criminal activities existed long before neuroscience studies emerged.
Without undermining the normative significance of law, we must keep
reasonable skepticism and continue to learn about the mitigating capacities
of neuro-evidence in sentencing decisions. Neuro-evidence should be
convergent and increase one’s confidence in conclusions.159 Remember, the
proffered neuro-evidence is usually additive and indirectly relevant, and the
brain-mind-behavior connections still need more research.160 Consequently,
following these suggestions will hopefully minimize the errors of neuroevidence, neuro-exuberance, and the “brain overclaim syndrome” made in
the legal system.161
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B.

Future Challenges to Neuro-Law and Neuro-Ethics
Neuroscience in the court itself may raise the debate of civil liberties in the

big picture, especially without formal guidelines. One of the major problems
is that of neuro-prediction, which may influence sentencing decisions in noncapital cases.162 Neuro-technology has been shown to increase the ability to
make accurate predictions of various types of behaviors, which include
criminal and antisocial behaviors.163 If technology can predict socially
deviant and criminal behaviors with relative accuracy, there may be a
tendency to punish people for crimes that they have yet to commit. Likewise,
if neuroscience can predict recidivism, there may be an inclination to use it
for public safety by incarcerating certain groups of offenders longer. 164 In
order to reduce recidivism, courts may resort to the solution of punishing
offenders before they commit another crime. Obviously, both situations may
lead to significant civil liberty problems.
According to court’s focal concerns perspective, neuro-evidence could
potentially be used to show aggravating factors in sentencing decisions in
less serious cases.165 Society already considers certain types of predictions as
justifiable and beneficial, and doing so more accurately may be tempting. 166
However, overreliance on neuroscience in legal contexts may threaten
people’s civil liberties. Labeling effects, stigmatization, and racial or ethnic
discrimination will become collateral consequences.167 In the foreseeable
future, neuroscience may not be sufficiently advanced to influence the law or
accurately predict future criminal behaviors. Consequently, neuro-prediction
162
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will not only face large political resistance, but will also be subjected to
constitutional challenges.168
Furthermore, neuro-ethics has become an academic domain receiving
increasing attention.169 Enormous legal, societal, and ethical issues need to
be considered when using neuroscience to inform criminal responsibility,
culpability, and sentencing decisions based on neuro-evidence and neuropredictions.170 Even though sentencing decisions are the most common
context for the introduction of neuro-evidence, the use of neuro-evidence
may “continue to be haphazard, ad hoc, and often ill-conceived.”171 Judges
and jurors generally are not good at evaluating neuro-evidence, and they may
either be too critical or too uncritical for the application of neuroscientific
information in sentencing decisions.172 But in some less severe cases, judges
are more likely to ask for neuroscientific evidence to help solve legal
problems.173 This paradox will raise questions about the extent that neuroevidence could apply to moral, political, and legal analyses, and will thus
draw appropriate conclusions within the ethical domain.174 Neuroscience in
a vacuum is a robust form of evidence, but its relevance in law and ethics
might not be, even far from having a causal influence on sentencing. New
ethical and legal theories and propositions will be needed to address this
dilemma and set guidelines to move forward.175

CONCLUSION
The interconnection between neuroscience and law generates increasing
attention and debate. When neuro-evidence is used to decide whether
168
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someone lives or dies, how that evidence is evaluated and inferred matters
significantly. From a comparison of two cases, State of Florida v. Hoskins
and State of Florida v. Nelson, it is clear that several circumstantial
considerations can make sentencing decisions different. However, the
underlying mechanism of how neuro-evidence serves as a mitigator in
various stages in determining criminal responsibility, culpability, and
proportionality of sentencing is far from conclusive. Instead, neuroscience
studies and techniques in their current stages make limited contributions to
producing a more fair and accurate criminal justice system.176 Therefore, we
should be skeptical and critical in evaluating the mitigating effects of neuroevidence in legal contexts to prevent problems such as neuro-exuberance,
over-interpretation, and “brain overclaim syndrome.”177
Although there are reasons to be cautious, the interconnection between
neuroscience and law is still promising in understanding criminal behaviors
as long as such multidisciplinary research becomes more mature, replicable,
ecologically valid, and normatively informative in law. Although it is
unlikely to drive a radical reform of the criminal justice system, neuroscience
can still influence law in the future.178 Although the mitigating effect of
neuro-evidence in sentencing decisions is multidimensional and complicated,
adopting a guideline for how to apply such evidence could disentangle its
complexity and formally regulate its application in the legal system.
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